Introduction
Environmental justice has emerged as a prominent public policy issue in the United States, and environmental justice considerations are currently being incorporated into policy and regulatory decisions at local, state, and federal levels Ž . of government Sexton and Zimmerman, 1999 . For example, environmental justice is now a formal criterion for EPA's preparation of environmental impact statements and environmental assessments required by the National Envi-Ž .Ž ronmental Policy Act NEPA U.S. Environmental Protec-. tion Agency, 1998 . These changes have occurred with relatively little public debate, in part because there is bipartisan consensus that environmental justice-generally used to mean some notion of adequate protection for everyone from the adverse effects of environmental pollution, regardless of age, culture, ethnicity, gender, race, or socioeconomic status-is an appropriate and desirable societal goal. Nevertheless, for most people, including many scientists and policy makers, environmental justice remains a vague and abstract concept that is difficult to define in practical, real-world terms. This needs to change as implementation of government policies aimed at promoting environmental justice makes the issue more tangible and personal.
Environmental decisions, whether they involve issues of environmental justice or not, are usually unacceptable to one or more affected parties because stakeholders have conflicting interests, perspectives, and values. Consequently, the decision-making process is often confrontational, emotionally charged, and litigious. Adding explicit consideration of environmental justice to this explosive mix threatens to make the process even more contentious Ž . and divisive Meersman, 1997; Cushman, 1998 . The irony is that while environmental justice has attained the status Ž of a legitimate public health issue Sexton and Anderson, . 1993; Sexton and Zimmerman, 1999 and has generated a Ž healthy dialogue regarding policy options Collin, 1992;  . Greenberg, 1993 Greenberg, , 1997 Anderton et al., 1994 , the related public policy debate seems to be increasingly driven by emotional rhetoric, personal agendas, and political correct-Ž ness Lavelle and Coyle, 1992; Cushman, 1993 Cushman, , 1998  . Kusek, 1994; Meersman, 1997 . In the face of intensifying discord, we must now confront the problem of implementing what are probably worthwhile, but still inadequately-defined goals. How, for example, should we operationalize the concept of environmental justice so as to strike the proper balance among effectiveness, efficiency, and equity? The debate will necessarily be rancorous because it is about competing core values-what kind of society do we want to live in?
To foster a more informed and substantive public deliberation about these important kinds of policy questions, it is essential to identify the crucial elements of environmental justice and to define them as explicitly and precisely as possible. The following discussion identifies the fundamental dimensions of environmental justice and highlights the resulting questions that are an inherent part of putting abstract concepts into operation.
Fundamental dimensions of environmental justice
In practice, environmental justice is a complex, multidimensional concept that cannot easily be pinned down. Indeed, as we attempt to show below, there are many possible legitimate definitions depending on one's perspective and values. The important point is not that any particular definition is right or wrong, but rather that choosing a definition has distinct implications for the design and implementation of both policy and science. These choices are critical and should be made explicit so that the public dialogue can be more focused.
The issue of environmental justice can be thought of as having five fundamental dimensions, which are summarized in Table 1 . The subsequent sections briefly describe Bryant and Mohai, 1992; Greenberg, 1993 Greenberg, , 1997 Hofrichter, 1993; Anderton et al., 1994; Bullard, 1994; Zimmerman, 1994; Been, 1995; Patterson and Andrews, . 1995; Ringquist, 1997 . No attempt is made in the present analysis to provide a complete literature review, but most of, if not all, the possible definitions discussed here can be found somewhere in the hundreds of articles, court cases, government statements, and public debates relating to the subject. The purpose of the present analysis is not to offer novel definitions, but to systematize the competing definitions to an extent that has not been previously attempted.
How Is Fairness Defined?
A necessary first step in analyzing issues of environmental justice is to define precisely what we mean by the term 'justice' in the context of environmental protection. Using an approach roughly based on Patterson and Andrews Ž . 1995 , we suggest that environmental justice can be defined as 'fairness' in terms of the decision-making process Ž . Ž procedural fairness andror the decision outcome sub-. stantive fairness . We contend that a legitimate definition of fairness need include only one or the other, although it might include both procedural and outcome measures. There are many possible definitional variants for fairness in the context of environmental justice, most of which have a rich conceptual history in western social philosophy.
The following list of principles for evaluating fairness includes criteria that have been used either explicitly or implicitly in previous definitions of environmental justice. They are listed in order from more procedural to more substantive:
1.A-Everyone can participate effectively in decisionmaking; 1.B-Decisions are made based on rules that will leave Ž . everyone ahead on average rule utilitarianism ; 1.C-Net changes in welfare from every decision are Ž . acceptable to everyone Pareto; free market libertarian ; 1.D-Net benefits are assigned in proportion to contri-Ž . butions andror losses cooperative game theory ; 1.E-The identified group suffers no more exposure than the population average; 1.F-Net benefits are distributed according to need Ž . Rawlsian; Marxist ; 1.G-All gross costs of environmental exposure are Ž . distributed evenly EPA . A legitimate definition of environmental justice might include several of these. For example, Patterson and An-Ž . drews 1995 , who offer a version of 1.A, argue that it should be combined with some measure of fair outcome. The problem with a broad definition that encompasses several of these criteria is that it may be difficult, if not impossible, to ever demonstrate that the conditions for environmental justice have been met.
Clearly, the definition of justice has substantial implications for how we assess whether environmental justice has been achieved, though this alone is not sufficient. The definitions do not specify any particular group or population as the focus of environmental justice concerns, an issue we address below. In most cases, the question of who is suffering an environmental injustice should not influence the question of whether an injustice is, in fact, occurring. The principles listed above also do not resolve the question of whether findings of environmental injustice must be based on a pattern of decisions over time or whether a single decision is sufficient. Moreover, it is not apparent from these principles whether environmental injustice can be caused by unintended decision outcomes or whether it must be the result of discriminatory intent. Perhaps do most importantly, the criteria themselves do not include a statement about how large the inevitable departures from perfection must be before we consider the situation unjust. Definition 1.A, one of many alternative versions of procedural fairness, is the most purely procedural, having no reference to actual or hypothetical outcomes. Patterson Ž . and Andrews 1995 argue that this measure of fairness can be assessed by answering a set of questions about citizen participation, such as ''Is there equal access to the process by all organized interest groups?'' ''Do non-affiliated citizens have equal access to the process?'' and ''Are all participants given access to the expertise necessary to evaluate the scientific and technical information available to them?'' 1 In essence, this definition hinges on meaningful involvement of affected groups and individuals in environmental decision making. Definition 1.B is the definition of fairness that is implicit in economics and its practical manifestation in policy making, cost-benefit analysis. This theory of fairness is based on the argument that if we take every action that is economically efficient, then everyone will come out ahead on average. Under such a system, individual decisions and Ž single outcomes will often be imbalanced 'unfair' in a . rough sense , but in theory the consistent application of the rule will result in fair outcomes. In the field of social welfare philosophy, this approach to fairness is known as 'rule utilitarianism'. 'Utilitarianism' refers to the idea that the standard for judging goodness is the aggregate welfare of everyone, and 'rule' indicates that social welfare is not calculated on a case-by-case basis, but in terms of the overall outcome from a consistent rule.
Definition 1.C focuses on individual decisions or actions rather than overall rules, and requires that each action be acceptable to everyone. This definition is more applica-Ž ble to single decisions such as siting a waste site, indus-. trial plant, freeway, incinerator, or other noxious facility Ž than to patterns with no clear individual actions such as . lower air quality in some neighborhoods . This notion of fairness simply says that if anyone suffers a net loss from an action-implying they would not accept it as a free-Ž market exchange-then it is unfair. In economics, this is . known as the Pareto criterion. Thus, if someone is going to suffer from an environmental hazard, she must be sufficiently compensated in some way so that the net result Ž . makes her better off in her own judgment . Operationally, it is impractical to achieve this outcome absolutely. Even if a neighborhood is adequately compensated for an environ-Ž mental hazard say by getting a new library and recreation . center in exchange for taking an incinerator , some indi-Ž viduals are going to suffer a net loss the householder who lives across the street from the new incinerator and has no . 2 children who will use the recreation center . Despite these problems, the general principle of an action being fair only if losses are directly compensated is still fairly well defined. Definition 1.D is difficult to define precisely, but it comes up frequently in the environmental justice literature and so is included in the list. The vaguely-defined notion Ž starts with the premise that certain people based on . geographic location or demographic characteristics are paying most of the costs of an environmental hazard while Ž . they do not get much or any more benefit than anyone Ž else. One focal point for cooperative negotiation a cooper-. ative 'game' in the economic sense would be to make sure that those who pay most of the costs get most of the benefits. Thus, instead of compensating people until they achieve some small net gain, as required by 1.C, they would potentially receive a large amount of compensation to give them most of the social benefits from the sources of environmental exposure. Again, this notion of fairness is difficult to operationalize, but roughly speaking, it seems to mean that people bearing a disproportionate burden of environmental hazards should get a lot more compensation than is implied by 1.C. Definition 1.E is probably the simplest definition, and is often implicit in discussions of environmental justice. Yet 2 If every individual had to sign off on any action to meet this fairness criterion, there would be a general holdout problem. This might be due to individuals who are indeed suffering a net loss, but could also simply be rent-seeking by those who are already coming out ahead. 1999 9 1 it is not usually an explicit part of the related policy or Ž philosophical debate. It is, however, a hypothesis that is . routinely tested in empirical studies. Among the reasons this definition might be less common are: it does not allow Ž . for fair compensation as in 1.C ; it depends too explicitly on politics-of-identity; or it is not, in the minds of advocates, sufficiently strong compared to 1.C, 1.D, or 1.F.
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Instead of basing the concept of fairness on environmental exposure and related compensation alone, definition 1.F expands into other aspects of individual welfare. It suggests that decisions about environmental exposures should contribute to improving the lot of individuals in our society who are less well off. This definition is implicit in many claims about environmental injustice, but like 1.D, it is relatively difficult to operationalize. How much net benefit is enough? Is it sufficient to make the worst-off Ž individuals somewhat better off in keeping with a Rawl-Ž . . sian social welfare function Rawls, 1971 or is it neces-Ž sary to narrow the gap between them and the better-off a . Marxist goal, roughly speaking ? This notion of fairness, like 1.D, suggests that 1.C is necessary but not sufficient Žthough a situation that made richer people less well off . might not violate 1.F, but would violate 1.C . Definition 1.F sets a very high standard for fairness, which can be applied to any policy decision, from corporate tax rates to zoning laws to bridge tolls, creating the potential to paralyze the decision-making process. Definition 1.G is effectively the intersection of 1.E across all possible definitions of group identity. Arguing that everyone should have an even share of exposures from Ž environmental hazards and perhaps an even share of the . associated benefits has a certain appeal. But even though it is quite fair, it is also impractical. Although no individual or group expressly argues for this definition, it is implied in the working definition of environmental justice Ž used by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency U.S.
. Environmental Protection Agency, 1998 , in response to Ž the President's executive order U.S. Environmental Pro-. tection Agency, 1994 . Obviously, the standard of equal hazard burden or equal exposures is never going to be met, and there is little point in doing empirical work to show this. On the other hand, definition 1.G could be used as a theoretical goal for judging some outcomes as more fair than others based on lower variance of exposures across all individuals.
Several possible rules that can be identified in policy discussions are intentionally omitted from this list. Caseutilitarianism is a variation on 1.B, wherein a utilitarian calculation of social welfare is made for individual actions rather than being used as a consistent rule. Unlike the theory behind cost-benefit analysis, there is no reason to assume that such a rule will lead to benefits for everyone, even at some theoretical limit. Though case utilitarianism is often implicitly proposed as a social-welfare function, the projects and situations it justifies are frequently antithetical to most of the goals of environmental justice advocates. Thus, we should be attentive to it in discussions of environmental justice, but not consider it a path to fairness.
Another idea that appears in the political discussion is the notion that any involuntary environmental exposure Ž . and related health risk to anyone is unacceptable, and no amount of compensation is adequate. While one could certainly debate the philosophical foundations for such a stance, it is obvious to most people that the goal of zero risk is impossible. Furthermore, the notion that no amount of compensation is appropriate for a health threat ignores the fact that policy-makers and individuals are constantly Ž . trading other goods money for varying levels of health threats.
What is the Scope of Concern?
For several of the preceding definitions of fairness, we must be specific about which hazards or risks are being considered: Ž 2.A-Only noxious facilities siting, enforcement, and . restoration decisions ; Ž 2.B-Other hazards including housing stock, occupa-. tion, household chemical use, and food gathering . The reason for this distinction is that many people believe that specific decisions about imposing involuntary environmental risks on people must meet a higher standard of fairness than risks posed by individuals' lifestyle. The more-procedural notions of fairness in the previous section may not even make sense under 2.B, while outcome-based measures may show greater unfairness if 2.B is the accepted scope.
How Is Unfairness Characterized?
A final critical step in defining injustice is to define the level of unfairness that constitutes an environmental injustice. The reality is that it is impossible to meet any of the definitions of fairness absolutely, all of the time. The inclusiveness of participation could always be criticized. Outcomes will inevitably be at least somewhat unjust to some people.
3 A possible exception is the economic procedural definition, 1.B, but since the theory behind the definition is itself imperfect, this begs the question. Consequently, it is important that we specify, to the extent possible, which deviations from 'fair' are defined as injustice.
3 One way to meet some of the definitions of fairness might be to make sure that every outcome favors groups that are considered possible victims of environmental injustice, at the expense of those who are not Ž eligible for consideration. This hardly seems like a fair or politically . practical solution.
Ž
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The criteria for determining unfairness will vary according to the definition of fairness. Possible criteria are diverse and span multiple dimensions. They include ques-Ž tions of magnitude e.g., How much worse must a group's exposure be before it is unfair under 1.E, since someone's . Ž exposure will always be a little worse? and standing e.g., How broad must participation be under 1.A, since somewhere in the world there will be someone else who wanted . to participate? . Deciding on these criteria can have important ramifications. For example, if injustice is defined to be any relatively small deviation from 'fair', then it is likely that most people will be suffering some form of environmental injustice, effectively rendering the definition useless. For environmental justice to be an empirically meaningful concept, the magnitude and nature of departures from fairness deemed to be unjust must be defined at the outset and used consistently.
Which IndiÕiduals or Groups are the Focus of Concern?
Short of achieving fairness according to definition 1.G, some group is going to suffer greater environmental expo-Ž sure than the rest of the population from any one source . and in general . This is not a difficult observation to make, but simple mathematical tautologies like these are often Ž overlooked in policy discussions Schelling, 1978, Chap. . 2 . The question is not whether some individuals bear a disproportionate burden of environmental hazards, because this will always be true. The question that is usually inherent in the concept of environmental justice is whether these individuals share some other characteristic, like race or socioeconomic status. In the current political discussion, environmental justice concerns are greatest for identifiable groups that are thought to systematically and involuntarily suffer a disproportionate burden of hazards and exposures. The practical and ethical implications of an environmental injustice vary depending on what group is suffering the injustice. 4 Historically, discussions of environmental justice concerns have focused on: Ž 4.A-Members of certain races or ethnic groups usually blacks andror Hispanics, but sometimes including recent immigrants from non-Western countries and some . people of European ancestry, such as Appalachians ; Ž . Ž 4.B-People with low socioeconomic status SES usu-and significant. For an empirical claim to be made about some group suffering an injustice, the group must be well defined. It might be 'the poor', 'blacks', or even 'poor blacks'. Multiple groups may be candidates for an environmental justice claim, but each needs to be defined and tested separately. A general claim that the people who are suffering disproportionately are members of some discriminated-against group is not well defined, and thus not a valid empirical claim. Indeed, such claims may be intended as moving targets. ally referring to income or wealth, but sometimes in-. cluding education level and other measures ; 4.C-Other groups or individuals defined based on Ž some distinguishing characteristics e.g., age, religion, . health status, or residential location . There has been quite a lot of debate about whether racerethnicity or SES is more closely associated with Ž exposure to environmental hazards Sexton and Anderson, . 1993; Sexton, 1997 . To some extent, this distinction does not really matter. If society agrees that environmental injustice is associated with both racerethnicity and SES, then some intervention may be warranted. From a public health perspective, the at-risk population can be targeted Ž . for intervention regardless of justice issues without resolving the debate of which factor has a stronger association, assuming the factors are correlated.
However, for many important purposes, the distinction does matter. In particular, it has an influence on whether the environmental justice issue will contribute to the emphasis on race in this country or whether it will focus attention on the material well-being of certain groups. It should be emphasized that any analysis that purports to show that race is more closely associated with hazard Ž exposure than SES e.g., the often quoted report by the United Church of Christ Commission on Racial Justice, . 1987 faces the challenge that race is fairly easy to measure while measures of SES are less precise. Thus, on average, the association with SES will be biased toward zero compared to the association with racerethnicity.
5
As previously noted, someone will inevitably be treated unfairly according to any definition of fairness. Consequently, if there is not an explicit ex ante identification of Ž . the group s eligible for consideration, then it will always be possible to statistically demonstrate injustice from any data. It is important, therefore, that allegations or hypotheses about environmental injustice explicitly identify the Ž affected group or groups and their distinguishing charac-. teristics so that appropriate empirical evidence can be collected and analyzed.
What is the Likely Root Cause of Unfairness?
Another dimension that needs to be defined has to do with the underlying cause or causes of an injustice. Like the Ž other dimensions, it matters for some purposes e.g., at-. tempts to stop the problem at its source but not others Že.g., interventions to improve the health of at-risk popula-. tions . 5 Advocates for racial justice who are inclined to dismiss this point should bear in mind that using a good measure of race and a noisy Ž measure of SES can lead to conclusions that race itself as opposed to . environment is the cause of certain negative outcomes, as in the contro-Ž . versial book, The Bell CurÕe Herrnstein and Murray, 1994 .
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In defining these categories, we offer a minor variation Ž . X are fairly intuitive, and we will not attempt to discuss the legal or moral definitions. Because intent is the key issue, empirical evidence in support of these claims tends to come from qualitative investigation Ž . e.g., journalistic investigations and reports rather than exposure assessment, epidemiology, economics, or demographics. Source 5.B is an intentional decision to distribute exposure unevenly, not due to a desire to discriminate, but because it may be easier to distribute hazards such that politically disadvantaged groups and communities receive more than their fair share. Such patterns in decision-making can be demonstrated through quantitative analysis, though individual cases probably cannot be identified except through qualitative means.
Source 5.C stems from scientific analyses that recommend certain choices based on maximizing net benefit Ž . somehow measured or minimizing total risk. These criteria may lead to disproportionate costs for some identifiable group. Indeed, willingness-to-pay analyses of costs will tend to heap environmental insults on the poor because they are able to pay less to avoid exposure so necessarily have a lower willingness-to-pay. 7 If such insults are uncompensated, such willingness-to-pay analysis would be an example of the case-utilitarianism that we rejected as a standard of fairness above. Risk analysis will not necessarily lead to disproportionate burdens, but it might overburden less-dense rural populations, and it may produce unexpected consequences if we have an inadequate understanding of health impacts. If adequate information is available, risk assessment methods could take account of possible negative synergies with other health threats like poor diets, and might argue for minimizing exposure for vulnerable Ž . groups Sexton, 1997 . In many cases, it will be difficult to establish empirically the source of any environmental injustice that exists, 6 Our list departs from Ringquist's by adding discrimination based on Ž SES, and relabeling the misnamed 'economic rationality' which would . reduce injustice by many definitions, not cause it as 'case utilitarianism' and combining it with Ringquist's separate risk assessment category. 7 Of course, poorer people can receive higher marginal benefit from compensation for exposure, so there may be legitimate reasons for fair Ž . disproportionate exposure with compensation , as defined by standards of fairness 1.B or 1.C, and possibly 1.D or 1.F. beyond determining whether disproportionate exposure was Ž . more voluntary 5.D or was imposed from the outside Ž X . due to 5.A, 5.A , 5.B, or 5.C . Quantitative analysis might also determine whether the claims that led to unfairness via 5.C were valid.
Depending on the claim being made, it may not be relevant to determine the motive. For example, the claim that people of low SES are suffering excess environmental exposure without compensation, in violation of fairness principle 1.E, 1.F, or 1.G, can be made, tested, or acted upon without knowing the motives that lead to the exposure pattern.
Comparison Groups and Other Methodological Decisions
No matter how environmental justice is defined, researchers studying the issue must make numerous methodological decisions, such as the spatial extent of exposures related to a particular noxious facility, the appropriate Ž comparison population, variables to control for e.g., popu-. Ž lation density , hazards of interest e.g., any noxious facil-. ity or just the most disliked , which statistical methods Ž should be used e.g., comparison of means vs. logistic . regression , and many other factors. This is left out of the taxonomy because it is not a matter of definition, but is comparably important and has similar implications for policy and science. The choices among various candidate methodologies or measures do not have obvious right answers. However, as we might expect, they can have Ž dramatic effects on the outcome Greenberg, 1993; Anderton et al., 1994; Zimmerman, 1994; Been, 1995; Been and . Gupta, 1997 .
The implications of such methodological ambiguities are particularly problematic when we are dealing with a politically contentious issue. In the worst case, a researcher with a particular bias can construct a model that produces the desired results from any given data set. A related tendency of some researchers is to provide multiple analyses of the data until they find a significant association. We label this the 'but if we' approach, as in a passage like ''the analysis, as originally specified in the model, showed no significant result, but if we restrict the analysis to the Ž upper quartile of the most noxious facilities, most urban . counties, etc. we find a significant association.'' When reporting results, it is all too common to present the significant association and bury or ignore the dozen variations that showed no association. Similarly, given that most quantitative claims of environmental injustice depend on fairly thin margins, defendants in lawsuits involving environmental justice will often be able to find some model that counters plaintiffs' claims using the same data. This is, of course, not unique to the study of environmental justice. As with any quantitative analysis, objective researchers must take care to distinguish between the testing of a well-defined ex ante hypothesis and the ex post observation of associations in the data. Rigorous, well-designed studies will adhere to scientific standards that allow for objective testing of hypotheses, and discourage or prevent spurious findings.
Implications for policy and science
The preceding discussion implies a complicated array of possible definitions for environmental justice. This suggests that if a researcher sets out to prove environmental injustice is taking place, chances are that he or she will be able to find one or more definitions among the many available for which the data support the injustice hypothesis. For claims of environmental injustice to be based on empirical evidence, it is important that analysts explicitly define environmental justice at the outset. We must agree up front on a mutually acceptable definition or set of definitions for environmental justice and then test relevant hypotheses in a rigorous and scientific manner. This is not possible when the definition is a moving target.
Some of the research and policy implications of defining environmental justice are illustrated by the following example, which is based on actual events. Today in this country it is common for a claim of environmental injustice to be lodged whenever and wherever proposals are made to locate a noxious facility in a poor, black neighborhood. For example, community activists and others have alleged that a proposed new polyvinyl chloride plant in Convent, LA is an environmental injustice. Accounts in the popular press imply this situation is necessarily a violation of environmental justice principles because the facility will be built in a poor, black neighborhood. As with most similar cases, the term 'environmental justice' is ill-defined. Although not explicit, it appears these claims are based on the assumption that unacceptable political Ž . expediency 5.B has led to a decision-making process that consistently leaves poor blacks worse off than their white Ž . counterparts in violation of 1.B . It is also possible that the claims of injustice are based on definitions 1.E or 1.G. It is unlikely that definitions 1.C, 1.D, or 1.F are involved, because the complaints do not acknowledge possible bene-Ž . fits e.g., economic advantages of the plant to local residents.
The Louisiana Governor recently set up a special task Ž force to investigate these allegations The Baton Rouge . Advocate, 1998 . The likelihood is that this 'investigation' will probably be more of a political exercise than a research study. Nevertheless, it is useful to ask what research should be done to address the question of whether siting the plant in Convent is, in fact, an environmental injustice. Testing the claim that fairness definition 5.B is violated Ž . requires a establishing what decision process was used Ž . Ž . either empirically or by explicit assumption , b deciding Ž . how to measure unfairness, and c testing whether the process will generally result in measurable unfairness for poor blacks. Similarly, to test whether political expediency is actually the cause of this situation one could survey the attitudes of local residents to determine whether they object to the plant being sited in their community. If the empirical evidence indicates they object but have been Ž politically overruled, this would tend to support but not . prove that the community was selected because it is politically disadvantaged.
An alternative way to make the claim of environmental injustice is to say the siting is unfair because it leaves people uncompensated for the extra risk they bear, which is a violation of fairness definition 1.C. In fact, at one point in this controversy a state district judge ordered the company proposing the plant to compensate nearby resi-Ž . dents for any drop in their property values Pack, 1998 . To establish a violation of 1.C, it is not necessary to carefully identify whether those who are suffering a net loss are poor, black, or otherwise identifiable. It is simply sufficient to establish that someone is suffering a net loss. To prove a net loss exists, it is possible to look at objective, quantifiable measures like property values, as suggested by the Louisiana judge.
Potentially, the claims of environmental injustice could be expanded beyond Convent, producing several additional areas for study and comparison. An allegation of unfair outcomes caused by political expediency might be easier to prove when put in the context of nearby communities, for example. If there is a broader concern about patterns of decision-making that systematically cause unfair outcomes across different locations or over time, then a broader study is necessary. A commonly used definition of environmental injustice is based on the assumption that siting decisions-however they are made-result in higherthan-average pollution exposures for poor people or people of color, which is a violation of fairness definitions 1.B, 1.E, or 1.G. Using any of these definitions makes it unnecessary to investigate motive, since that is not part of Ž how unfairness is judged. It would be important, though, . for determining how best to address documented injustice. However, it would still be necessary, prior to conducting the research, to specify the hypothesis to be tested. This Ž . would necessarily involve defining a how exposure will Ž . be determined, b which definition of unfairness is being Ž . tested, c which siting or regulatory decisions are being Ž . analyzed, d how much of a departure from fairness Ž . justifies a finding of environmental injustice, e the identi-Ž . fying characteristics of the groups being studied, and f the comparison group or population. Decisions about these and related issues would, in turn, affect choices about the quantity and quality of data to be collected and the statistical analyses employed.
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Although the need to conduct hypothesis-testing research is clear, too often investigators ignore a basic tenet of the scientific method: state the hypothesis and specify how it will be tested prior to initiating the study. Ideally, the hypothesis should be based on current understanding of or reasonable assumptions about causal relationships, and be directly relevant to answering important questions about environmental justice. In general, it is better to answer the right questions, if only imprecisely, than to answer the wrong questions definitively.
Summary and conclusions
If policy makers and scientists are serious about achieving the societal goal of environmental justice, then they must be definite and explicit about what it means. While we have suggested here that some definitions of environmental justice are flawed for objective reasons, our purpose is not to argue the relative merits of any particular definition. Instead, we stress the importance of recognizing five fundamental dimensions of environmental justice, and the related necessity to move beyond fuzzy concepts and clearly define what environmental justice means in terms of our lives. Ideally, a single well-defined definition will eventually emerge, one that is workable and acceptable to everyone, while related concepts will still receive attention but not under the same rubric.
Progress toward this ideal is currently thwarted, however, by our collective failure to confront the challenges and complexities of defining environmental justice. Part of the problem is rooted in our innate desire to avoid conflict and sidestep difficult decisions. Issues of environmental justice raise troublesome questions and force us to confront unpleasant choices about whether to address this problem or that one, or whether to protect one group instead of another. It is human nature to shy away from this onerous task and to seek ways of avoiding the exercise altogether. But serious headway toward attaining environmental justice for everyone, regardless of age, culture, ethnicity, health conditions, gender, race, or socioeconomic status, depends on clear-cut decisions about how to put principles into practice. Our point is that we must decide on a definition or set of definitions for environmental justice, and that this decision has important ramifications for both policy and science.
